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ABSTRACT. The anticipatory reasonable adjustment duty, introduced by the
Disability Discrimination Act 1995 and now found in the Equality Act 2010,
has been hailed as an innovative and proactive tool for embedding disability
equality in services and public functions. Despite important successes, the
duty has had a surprisingly low profile in academic scholarship and has
struggled to fulfil its practical potential. We seek to understand how this
has happened, identifying a range of factors that may operate as blockages
to the success of the duty. Whilst these factors are interrelated, we group
them under three main headings – visibility, uncertainty and enforcement.
We reflect critically on whether, and if so how, relevant blockages can be
tackled to enable the duty to embed disability equality more effectively within
services and public functions and whether new supplementary measures
(particularly concerning accessibility) are also needed.
KEYWORDS: disability, anticipatory reasonable adjustment, discrimination,
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I. INTRODUCTION
The anticipatory reasonable adjustment duty in the Equality Act 2010
(EqA) requires providers of services and public functions continually to
identify any possible disability-related disadvantage, and to take reasonable
steps to avoid or remove it – failure to do so constituting unlawful discrim-
ination. It has been described, by key figures in the former Disability Rights
Commission (DRC), as “immensely significant” and “a major driver in
encouraging service providers to think in advance about removing barriers
experienced by disabled customers or potential customers”.1 A Danish
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1 C. Gooding and C. Casserley, “Open for All? Disability Discrimination Laws in Europe Relating to
Goods and Services” in A. Lawson and C. Gooding (eds.), Disability Rights in Europe: From
Theory to Practice (Oxford 2005), 135, s. 4.2.
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scholar, after scrutinising both the EqA’s duty and the analogous duty in
Norway,2 has hailed the former as a particularly promising example of
such duties.3 It has also provided inspiration for similar (although ultim-
ately unsuccessful) legislative initiatives at the EU level.4
Over the years, the anticipatory reasonable adjustment duty has provided
the basis for a number of high-profile cases, with far-reaching implications
for duty-bearers. In relation to public functions, for example, it was held in
ZH v Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police5 that the duty was breached
by the failure of officers to adjust their standard procedures when interact-
ing with an autistic person. Roads v Central Trains6 and Royal Bank of
Scotland v Allen7 provide examples of services cases in which failures to
adjust exclusionary physical and structural features were found to contra-
vene the duty. In First Group v Paulley,8 the Supreme Court held that a
bus company had breached the duty by failing to put in place systems
that made it sufficiently clear that wheelchair users should have priority
access to designated wheelchair accessible spaces. The duty is currently
being used to mount a case involving several hundred claims based on
failures by supermarkets to embed adequately disability equality in their
service delivery during the first Covid-19 lockdown period.9
Despite these successes, the duty is struggling to achieve its aims. In
2017, the Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) reported that
disabled people continue to experience significant barriers to accessing ser-
vices and public functions10 – a problem worsened by the Covid-19 cri-
sis.11 Two parliamentary committees have drawn attention to wide-scale
implementation failures, identifying lack of awareness and understanding
2 Act of 6 June 2006 No. 42 relating to a prohibition against discrimination on the basis of disability, as
amended by Act of 21 June 2013 No. 61 (the Anti-Discrimination and Accessibility Act), ch. 3.
3 M. Liisberg, “Accessibility of Services and Discrimination: Concentricity, Consequence and the
Concept of Anticipatory Reasonable Adjustment” (2015) 15 International Journal of Discrimination
and the Law 123.
4 See e.g. the European Commission’s Proposal for a Directive on Implementing the Principle of Equal
Treatment Between Persons Irrespective of Religion or Belief, Disability, Age or Sexual Orientation
(COM/2008/426 final), Article 4, which reads “access to and supply of goods and services which are
available to the public, including housing, shall be provided by anticipation”.
5 [2012] EWHC 604 (Q.B.), [2012] Eq.L.R. 425.
6 [2004] EWCA Civ 1541, (2005) 21 Const.L.J. 456.
7 [2009] EWCA Civ 1213, (2010) 112 B.M.L.R. 30.
8 [2017] UKSC 4, [2017] 1 W.L.R. 423.
9 J. Pring, “Coronavirus: Supermarkets Face ‘Biggest Class Action of Its Kind’ Over Discrimination
Claims”, Disability News Service, available at https://www.disabilitynewsservice.com/coronavirus-
supermarkets-face-biggest-class-action-of-its-kind-over-discrimination-claims/#:~:text=More%20than%
20200%20disabled%20people,legal%20case%20of%20its%20kind (last accessed 7 April 2021).
10 EHRC, “Being Disabled in Britain: A Journey Less Equal” (2017), available at https://www.equality-
humanrights.com/en/publication-download/being-disabled-britain-journey-less-equal (last accessed 7
April 2021), especially ch. 8.2.
11 House of Commons Women and Equalities Committee, “Unequal Impact? Coronavirus, Disability and
Access to Services” (2020) HC 1050, available at https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/4068/
documents/40461/default/ (last accessed 7 April 2021).
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of the duty’s existence and requirements as a major cause of the problem.12
According to the House of Lords Select Committee on the Equality Act
2010 and Disability (hereafter, “the House of Lords Committee”), “witness
after witness told us that . . . the provisions were neither well known nor
well understood”13 either by disabled people in whose favour they should
be operating or by duty-bearers who should be implementing them. It noted
particular problems relating to service providers’ limited knowledge of the
existence of the anticipatory reasonable adjustment duty.14 Similar limita-
tions in the awareness of those discharging public functions (relating to
planning) were also recognised as hindering EqA compliance by the
House of Commons Women and Equalities Committee.15 Another problem
is the failure of many duty-bearers to grasp that reasonable adjustment
duties impose binding legal obligations, tending instead to view them as
“favouritism” or the provision of “special treatment” or “perks”.16
Interestingly, despite drawing attention to the importance of the anticipa-
tory duty in its 2017 report on disability and the built environment, the
Women and Equalities Committee is itself guilty of overlooking it in subse-
quent work. In its 2019 report on enforcing the EqA, the Committee asserts
that there are currently only two “sets of equality-related duties that require a
proactive approach” – the public sector equality duty (PSED) and the gender
pay gap regulations.17 The omission of the anticipatory reasonable adjust-
ment duty from this list sounds loud alarm bells about the thickness of
the folds of obscurity in which the duty is currently cloaked.
In academic literature too, although there are examples of relevant schol-
arship,18 the profile of the duty has been surprisingly low. For example, it is
not mentioned at all inMcColgan’s multi-jurisdictional monograph on equal-
ity law (including the EqA),19 and, while acknowledged in Hepple’s
12 House of Lords Select Committee on the Equality Act 2010 and Disability, “The Equality Act 2010:
The Impact on Disabled People” (2016) HL Paper 117, available at https://publications.parliament.
uk/pa/ld201516/ldselect/ldeqact/117/117.pdf (last accessed 7 April 2021); and House of Commons
Women and Equalities Committee, “Building for Equality: Disability and the Built Environment”
(2017) HC 631, available at https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmwomeq/631/
631.pdf (last accessed 7 April 2021).
13 House of Lords Committee, “The Equality Act 2010”, at [201].
14 Ibid., at [202]–[208].
15 See e.g. Women and Equalities Committee, “Building for Equality”, [63], [69].
16 House of Lords Committee, “The Equality Act 2010”, [206]–[207].
17 House of Commons Women and Equalities Committee, “Enforcing the Equality Act 2010: The Role of
Law and the Equality and Human Rights Commission” (2019) HC 1470, available at https://publications.
parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmwomeq/1470/1470.pdf (last accessed 7 April 2021), [138].
18 For analysis of this duty prior to the EqA, see e.g. A. Lawson, Disability and Equality Law in Britain:
The Role of Reasonable Adjustment (Oxford 2008). For post EqA analysis, see e.g. Liisberg,
“Accessibility of Services and Discrimination”; A. Pearson, “What’s Worth Got to Do with It?
Language and the Socio-legal Advancement of Disability Rights and Equality” (2014) 20(3) Web
Journal of Current Legal Issues, available at http://webjcli.org/index.php/webjcli/article/view/352 (last
accessed 7 April 2021); and A. Pearson, “The Debate about Wheelchair Spaces on Buses goes
Round and Round: Access to Public Transport for People with Disabilities as a Human Right”
(2018) 69 Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 1. Other publications, focusing on the implementation of
the anticipatory duty in specific sectors, will be mentioned where relevant in the discussion below.
19 A. McColgan, Discrimination, Equality and the Law (Oxford 2014).
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monograph on the EqA, it features only on two pages20 and is not mentioned
at all in the broader discussions of proactive duties.21 The reactive or respon-
sive reasonable adjustment duty is by no means well known or implemented,
but its profile is significantly higher than that of its anticipatory sibling.22
In this article, we draw attention to problems which the anticipatory rea-
sonable adjustment duty has encountered and reflect critically on how they
might be addressed so as to give the duty a stronger chance of fulfilling its
aim of embedding disability equality in services and public functions.
Academic literature will be referred to where relevant but, given the surpris-
ingly small amount of such scholarship, we will also draw extensively on
parliamentary enquiries23 – which provide rich sources of data about the
operation of the duty in practice as well as suggestions for reform.
The article is divided into five main parts. The first of these provides con-
text for the subsequent analysis by explaining the duty’s origins, the legisla-
tive provisions onwhich it is based, and its relationshipwith other obligations
in the EqA and the UNConvention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
(CRPD).24 The following three parts each identify and reflect on different
types of problems or blockages to success – visibility, uncertainty and
enforcement respectively. We conclude that reform is needed if disability
inclusion is to be effectively embedded in services and public functions
and argue that, as well as measures focusing on the duty itself, such reform
will also need to address the operation and enforcement of the EqA more
generally and to introduce new supplementary accessibility regulations.
II. SITUATING THE DUTY
A. Historical Origins
The anticipatory reasonable adjustment duty, now in the EqA, dates back to
interpretations in codes of practice of the Disability Discrimination Act
20 B. Hepple, Equality: The Legal Framework, 2nd ed. (Oxford 2014), 96–97.
21 Ibid., ch. 6 and 220–24.
22 See further S. Bunbury, “The Employer’s Duty to Make Reasonable Adjustments. When Is a
Reasonable Adjustment, Not Reasonable?” (2009) 10 International Journal of Discrimination and the
Law 111; A. Lawson, “Disability and Employment in the Equality Act 2010: Opportunities Seized,
Lost and Generated” (2011) 40 Industrial Law Journal 359 – although the anticipatory duty also features
here; D. Foster and V. Wass, “Disability in the Labour Market: An Exploration of Concepts of the Ideal
Worker and Organisational Fit that Disadvantage Employees with Impairments” (2013) 47 Sociology
705; R. Harwood, “‘The Dying of the Light’: The Impact of the Spending Cuts, and Cuts to
Employment Law Protections, on Disability Adjustments in British Local Authorities” (2014) 29
Disability and Society 1511; M. Bell, “Mental Health at Work and the Duty to Make Reasonable
Adjustments” (2015) 44 Industrial Law Journal 194; R. Crasnow and S. Fraser-Butlin, “Disabled
Compared to Whom? An Analysis of the Current Jurisprudence on the Appropriate Comparator
under the UK Equality Act’s Reasonable Adjustment Duty” (2015) 15 Equal Rights Review 75; and
R. Harwood, “What Has Limited the Impact of UK Disability Equality Law on Social Justice?”
(2016) 5(4) Laws, available at https://www.mdpi.com/2075-471X/5/4/42 (last accessed 7 April 2021).
23 House of Lords Committee, “The Equality Act 2010”; Women and Equalities Committee, “Building for
Equality”; Women and Equalities Committee, “Enforcing the Equality Act 2010”.
24 2515 UNTS 3 (CRPD).
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1995 (DDA) – a statute repealed and replaced by the EqA. The DDA did
not explicitly mention such a duty. It did provide, however, that in services
contexts the reasonable adjustment duty operated in favour of “disabled
persons”, in the plural, whereas in employment contexts it operated in
favour of a “disabled person”, in the singular. This reference to disabled
persons in the plural was interpreted by the National Disability Council
as indicating that the duty was owed to disabled people generally, with
the result that it must arise prior to duty-bearers becoming aware of any
particular disabled person being disadvantaged.25 The statutory codes of
practice on services, drawn up by that Council and subsequently the
DRC, stressed the “anticipatory” nature of the duty.26
In 2004 the Court of Appeal, in Roads v Central Trains,27 endorsed the
approach adopted in these codes of practice. The reference to “disabled per-
sons” in the articulation of the reasonable adjustment duty in the services
provisions meant that no reasonable adjustment duty would arise unless
disabled persons generally would have experienced the required level of
disadvantage. Roads thus affirms that some element of group disadvantage
was an essential element of anticipatory reasonable adjustment claims.
According to Sedley L.J., in order to establish that “disabled persons”
would have been sufficiently disadvantaged, it was not necessary to show
that “all or most disabled persons” would have been so affected;28 instead,
demonstrating “any significant impact on, say, wheelchair users as a class”
would suffice.29 He also warned against demanding detailed statistical evi-
dence to prove disadvantage to a relevant group, urging that judges should
instead rely on their own appraisal of the situation with the help of expert
evidence where appropriate.30 Sedley L.J. also helpfully observed that, in
assessments of the reasonableness of adjustments, regard should be had
to the fact that the policy of the Act is “to provide access to a service as
close as it is reasonably possible to get to the standard normally offered
to the public at large”.31
25 See generally the account of these duties provided by J. White (a member of the National Disability
Council) in “DDA: Service Providers’ Duty to Make Reasonable Adjustments” (1999) 88 Equal
Opportunities Review 33.
26 Department for Education and Employment, DDA 1995 Code of Practice, Rights of Access: Goods,
Facilities, Services and Premises 1999, [4.7]; DRC, DDA 1995 Code of Practice, Rights of Access:
Goods, Facilities, Services and Premises 2002, [4.14]; and DRC, DDA 1995 Code of Practice,
Rights of Access: Services to the Public, Public Authority Functions, Private Clubs and Premises
2006, [6.16]. For discussion of the duty by people involved in drafting these codes, see White,
“DDA”; and Gooding and Casserley, “Open for All?”, 152–54.
27 [2012] EWHC 604 (Q.B.).
28 Ibid., at [26].
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid., quoting from Mynors Ch. in Re Holy Cross, Pershore [2001] 3 W.L.R. 1521, at [105] (Worcester
Consistory Court).
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B. Current Statutory Underpinnings
The anticipatory reasonable adjustment duty continued into the EqA with
the benefit of a number of improvements not significantly affecting its sub-
stance. It is now rooted in sections 20–22 of the EqA, read together with
schedules 2 and 3.32 Before explaining these provisions more fully, it
should be noted that section 29(7) places the duty on providers of services
and public functions and that sections 20–22 apply to what may be termed
the “reactive” or “responsive” reasonable adjustment duty as well as its
anticipatory sibling. This reactive duty, applicable to employment and
premises cases, arises only when a potential duty-bearer knows or ought
to know that a particular disabled person is placed at a substantial disadvan-
tage within the meaning of section 20(3)–(5).
Paragraphs (3)–(5) of section 20, which require duty-bearers to take rea-
sonable steps to tackle relevant types of disadvantage, refer to a disabled
person in the singular being placed at a substantial disadvantage. This
emphasis on a particular disabled person is a key feature of the reactive rea-
sonable adjustment duty but inconsistent with an anticipatory approach.
Schedule 2 of the EqA provides that, in services and public functions
cases, the term “disabled person” in section 20(3)–(5) should be read
instead as “disabled persons generally”.33 It is through this conversion of
phrases in section 20(3)–(5), from the singular to the plural, that the EqA
unleashes the anticipatory dimension of its reasonable adjustment duties
in contexts of services and public functions. Importantly, however, the ref-
erence in section 21 to a disabled person in the singular remains unchanged.
This specifies that breach of the reasonable adjustment duty constitutes dis-
crimination against a disabled person only if the duty-bearer “fails to com-
ply with that duty in relation to that person”. Accordingly, although the
anticipatory reasonable adjustment duty arises regardless of whether or
not a particular individual is placed at a substantial disadvantage, breach
of it will constitute unlawful discrimination only if a particular disabled per-
son can show that the breach caused them substantial disadvantage.
Besides giving the duty its anticipatory nature, Schedule 2, together with
Schedule 3, shapes the character and scope of the anticipatory reasonable
adjustment duty in various other ways. For instance, steps which would
fundamentally alter the nature of a service or be beyond the power of
those exercising a public function will never be “reasonable”;34 and
32 Note that, although education is a type of service (in relation to which the anticipatory duty operates), it
is dealt with separately in Schedule 13.
33 Schedule 2, s. 2(2).
34 Schedule 2, s. 2(7)–(8).
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exemptions are introduced for transport vehicles (particularly in relation to
physical features),35 legislation, and parliamentary and judicial functions.36
As already mentioned, authoritative guidance on the duty is set out in
statutory codes of practice – the current version of which is compiled by
the EHRC.37 This articulates in plain language key implications of the com-
plex legislative framework outlined above. It stresses that the duty is “owed
to disabled people generally”,38 which means “it applies regardless of
whether the service provider knows that a particular person is disabled or
whether it currently has disabled customers”.39 The duty requires “consid-
eration of, and action in relation to, barriers that impede people with one or
more kinds of disability prior to an individual disabled person seeking to
use the service or . . . function”.40 The Code explains that the duty is a
“continuing” and “evolving” one, demanding that duty-bearers keep “the
ways they are meeting the duty under regular review” rather than treating
it as “something that needs simply to be considered once only, and then for-
gotten”.41 As explained in Section IV(A) below, the Code also provides
guidance as to what is meant by “reasonable” for purposes of the duty.
This guidance is particularly important given that the EqA contains no
such guidance and that the notion of reasonableness in this context covers
both the effectiveness of the steps taken (in removing the disadvantage) and
issues relating to disproportionate or undue burden.
C. Relationship Between the Anticipatory Reasonable Adjustment Duty and
Other Equality Act Obligations
The relationship between the anticipatory reasonable adjustment duty and
related EqA obligations is an important and complex issue demanding
more space than is available in an article such as this with a different prin-
cipal focus. It has been addressed more fully by Lawson in work which,
although pre-dating the EqA,42 remains relevant today and on which we
draw to provide context for readers less familiar with the anticipatory
duty than other parts of UK equality law.
35 Schedule 2, s. 3.
36 Schedule 3, ss. 2, 1 and 3, respectively.
37 EHRC, “Equality Act 2010 Code of Practice: Services, Public Functions and Associations. Statutory
Code of Practice” (2011), available at https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/sites/default/files/services-
code_0.pdf (last accessed 7 April 2021), particularly ch. 7.
38 Ibid., at [7.19].
39 Ibid., at [7.22].
40 Ibid., at [7.20]; see also [7.24]–[7.25].
41 Ibid., at [7.27].
42 See Lawson, Disability and Equality Law in Britain, chs. 3.2.1–3.2.4 and 3.3.1–3.3.4 for comparison of
reactive and anticipatory reasonable adjustment duties; ch. 4.2.2 for comparison of the anticipatory rea-
sonable adjustment duty with indirect discrimination; and ch. 5.5.1 for comparison between the antici-
patory duty and the Disability Equality Duty (the predecessor of the Public Sector Equality Duty in the
disability context).
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The EqA’s reasonable adjustment duties, if breached, result in free-
standing liability for discrimination, distinct from direct or indirect discrim-
ination, for example. These reasonable adjustment duties are anticipatory in
contexts of services and public functions but reactive in contexts of
employment and housing. No distinction is made between these two
types of reasonable adjustment duties outside the schedules of the Act
and both require duty-bearers to take reasonable steps to prevent
disability-related substantial disadvantage. Nevertheless, there are signifi-
cant differences. Most notably, the reactive duty is triggered only when a
duty-bearer knows or ought to know that a particular disabled person is
encountering (or likely to encounter) a substantial disadvantage, whereas
the anticipatory duty arises whenever a duty-bearer ought to anticipate
that broad groups of disabled people might encounter such a disadvantage.
The anticipatory reasonable adjustment duty does much of the same
work as indirect discrimination – a form of obligation not applicable to
disability in services and public functions cases prior to the EqA. Both
include an element of group disadvantage, although enforcement is by indi-
viduals adversely affected by breach. The anticipatory duty, however, is
more overtly proactive and solution-oriented and is free of the statistical
complexity which has historically bedevilled indirect discrimination law.
Finally, there are important points of connection between the anticipatory
reasonable adjustment duty and the Public Sector Equality Duty (PSED).
Both impose proactive obligations on duty-bearers to attend to disability-related
disadvantage associated with their policies and operations. Unlike the former,
however, the PSED applies only to public bodies and thus does not extend to
the private sector. Furthermore, the PSED (which does not create liability for
discrimination) is a process-oriented duty, based on the need to have “due
regard” to disability equality in relevant decision-making; whereas the anticipa-
tory reasonable adjustment duty looks to outcomes.
D. Situating the Anticipatory Reasonable Adjustment
Duty Within the UN CRPD
The UN CRPD, ratified by the UK in June 2009, requires states parties to
prohibit discrimination on the basis of disability43 and defines such discrim-
ination to include a failure to provide reasonable accommodation.44 It is
clear from the definition of “reasonable accommodation” in Article 2 that
it is an “ex nunc duty . . . enforceable from the moment an individual
with an impairment needs it in a given situation”.45 It is thus akin to the
EqA’s reactive reasonable adjustment duty but not its anticipatory one.
43 Articles 5, 4(1)(e).
44 Article 2.
45 CRPD Committee, “General Comment No. 2 (2014) – Article 9: Accessibility” (CRPD/C/GC/2, 2014),
[26].
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Unsurprisingly, nothing like the anticipatory reasonable adjustment duty
appears in the list of types of discrimination recognised in international
human rights law, set out in the CRPD Committee’s General Comment
No 6.46 This, of course, does not mean that it is inconsistent with the
CRPD. Indeed, it covers ground conventionally covered by indirect dis-
crimination (which does feature in the list47) as well as providing a poten-
tially powerful way of harnessing equality law to ensure the accessibility of
services and facilities offered to the public – as required by Article 9 of the
CRPD. These accessibility obligations, like the EqA’s anticipatory duty, are
group-oriented and “proactive”, “systemic” and “ex ante” in nature.48
Qualified as it is by the concept of reasonableness, however, the EqA’s
anticipatory duty – even if widely understood and implemented – will
only ever go some of the way to supporting enforcement of rights to acces-
sibility in Article 9.49 It does not follow from the fact that it is only one of
the measures needed for implementing Article 9 rights, however, that its
contribution is unimportant.50 Far from it, in the UK the anticipatory rea-
sonable adjustment duty has important work to do in contributing to the
enforcement of CRPD rights and the advancement of the model of “inclu-
sive equality”51 on which it rests.
III. VISIBILITY PROBLEMS
A. Invisibility on the Face of the Equality Act 2010
As will be evident from the previous section, a superficial hunt through the
EqA will not unearth the anticipatory reasonable adjustment duty. It does
not feature in any of the headings of sections or schedules; nor is there
any explicit mention of the “anticipatory reasonable adjustment duty”.
For these reasons, this duty is unquestionably not visible on the face of
the legislation.
This invisibility has come about despite the fact that, by the time the EqA
was being debated, the anticipatory reasonable adjustment duty was well
established as a form of DDA discrimination prohibition, distinct from
the reactive reasonable adjustment duty. Instead of making this obvious
in the crafting of the new statute, however, both types of reasonable adjust-
ment duties are shoehorned into sections 20–22 but in language that is
appropriate only to the reactive form. As explained above, the anticipatory
46 CRPD Committee, “General Comment No. 6 (2018) on Equality and Non-Discrimination” (CRPD/C/
GC/6, 2018), [18].
47 Ibid., at [18(b)].
48 Terms used ibid., at [24].
49 See generally on Article 9: A. Lawson, “Article 9: Accessibility” in I. Bantekas, M. Stein and
D. Amastasiou (eds.), The UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: A
Commentary (Oxford 2018), ch. 12.
50 For a contrary view, see Pearson, “What’s Worth Got to Do with It?”; and “Access to Public Transport”.
51 CRPD Committee, “General Comment No. 6”, [8]–[11].
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duty emerges from changes to the wording of these sections brought about
by Schedule 2. While there was clearly no deliberate attempt to hide the
anticipatory duty, it is difficult to imagine how it might have been more
comprehensively hidden in the EqA had this actually been the intention
of the legislators. The consequent risk that the duty will be overlooked is
exacerbated by the fact that the duty does not operate in relation to employ-
ment52 – the area of equality law that attracts most attention in case law and
scholarship alike.
The most obvious solution to this visibility problem would be to reform
the EqA so as to bring the anticipatory reasonable adjustment duty out of
the shadows of the schedules and give it a place of its own, with a title,
in the main body of the Act. It might also be helpful to give it a name
that separates it more clearly from the reasonable adjustment duty that oper-
ates in the employment context. It is noteworthy that the US Americans
with Disabilities Act 1990 terms its equivalent of this duty the “reasonable
modification” duty,53 as opposed to the “reasonable accommodation” duty
which operates in employment cases.54 Such possibilities, however, were
not considered in the lead-up to the EqA or by the House of Lords
Committee.55
B. Reduced Visibility in Official Guidance
Codes of practice – particularly those that have received parliamentary
approval and thus become “statutory”56 – have an important role to play
in providing guidance and raising awareness of equality law obligations
and making legal technicalities comprehensible to duty-bearers and dis-
abled people alike.57 Indeed, as explained above,58 it was the early DDA
codes of practice that originally gave shape and content to the anticipatory
reasonable adjustment duty. There is some concern, however, that the visi-
bility, quantity and emotional power of guidance on disability-specific
issues such as the anticipatory reasonable adjustment duty has reduced
since the DDA was replaced by the EqA, largely because codes of practice
now address many issues besides disability.59
52 See Lawson, “Disability and Employment in the Equality Act 2010”, 379; and Lawson, Disability and
Equality Law in Britain, 126–28 and 173–76 for arguments that the EqA should have extended the duty
to the employment context.
53 For public authorities, 42 USC s. 12131(2); and for private entities providing public services 42 USC
s. 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii). See generally P. Blanck, Disability Law and Policy (St. Paul 2020), ch. 12.2.
54 42 USC s. 12112(5)(A)).
55 House of Lords Committee, “The Equality Act 2010”; Women and Equalities Committee, “Building for
Equality”.
56 According to Equality Act 2006, s. 15(4), such codes “(a) shall be admissible in evidence in criminal or
civil proceedings, and (b) shall be taken into account by a court or tribunal in any case in which it
appears . . . to be relevant”.
57 See further N. O’Brien, “The UK Disability Rights Commission and Strategic Law Enforcement:
Transcending the Common Law Mind” in Lawson and Gooding, Disability Rights in Europe, 259–60.
58 See notes 26–31 above and accompanying text.
59 See e.g. House of Lords Committee, “The Equality Act 2010”, [158].
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In light of such concerns, and to help increase awareness and understand-
ing of reasonable adjustment duties, the House of Lords Committee recom-
mended that the EHRC should depart from its general practice of issuing
codes applicable to all protected characteristics and draft “a specific Code
of Practice on reasonable adjustments”,60 as well as industry-specific
guidance.61
The EHRC has not issued a specific statutory code on reasonable adjust-
ments, however. This is in part because a statutory code cannot be issued
without government willingness to lay it before Parliament – a willingness
that, since the infancy of the EqA, has not been forthcoming.62 The EHRC,
however, has published non-statutory guidance focusing specifically on this
duty, albeit that it is aimed only at disabled people and not also at duty-
bearers.63 In addition, it has engaged in a number of tailored initiatives
to advise, guide and otherwise educate duty-bearers on the anticipatory
duty.64 In 2020, for example, it issued guidance to providers of retail ser-
vices, including supermarkets, about carrying out their obligations to
make adjustments for disabled customers in the context of Covid-19.65
The capacity of the EHRC to engage in such tailored initiatives is, however,
much more limited than that of the DRC, which (together with the
Commission for Racial Equality and Equal Opportunities Commission) it
replaced on 1 January 2007.66 The House of Lords Committee noted in
2016 that the EHRC’s budget had been reduced by 75 per cent since
2010, making its core funding for 2015–16 £17.1 million – substantially
less than the DRC’s budget of £21.2 million for 2006–07.67
In short, while the EHRC has issued valuable guidance on the anticipa-
tory reasonable adjustment duty, it is more limited and less prominent than
the guidance previously issued by the DRC. Any positive change seems
unlikely as long as government resistance to new EqA statutory codes per-
sists and the EHRC continues to be funded at levels that compare so
unfavourably with those of the DRC.
IV. UNCERTAINTY PROBLEMS
Here we identify and discuss two types of legal uncertainty which, we sug-
gest, have contributed to confusion and controversy about the duty. The
first concerns the inherent uncertainty in the notion of reasonableness.
60 Ibid., at [231] and rec. 18.
61 Ibid., at [234] and rec. 19.
62 An approach described as “perverse” by the House of Lords Committee: ibid., at [163].
63 EHRC, Using a Service: Reasonable Adjustments for Disabled People, 2 December 2019.
64 See in particular the powers granted by Equality Act 2006, s. 13(1)(c) and (d), in connection with the
duties of the EHRC to “promote awareness and understanding” of EqA rights and to “work toward the
elimination of unlawful discrimination” in Equality Act 2006, s. 8(1)(d), (f).
65 See EHRC, Retailers’ Legal Responsibility to Disabled Customers, 4 September 2020.
66 By virtue of the Equality Act 2006.
67 House of Lords Committee, “The Equality Act 2010”, [133].
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While this brings with it important benefits in terms of flexibility, we argue
that more should be done to limit its scope through the introduction of
accessibility and other regulations. The second issue that will be addressed
here is also connected with the idea of reasonableness but, because it raises
distinct uncertainty problems, is given separate attention. It concerns ques-
tions about the extent to which the anticipatory duty requires duty-bearers
to respond to the specific circumstances of particular disabled individuals.
In other words, it concerns the extent to which the anticipatory duty
imposes obligations that are reactive as well as ones that are anticipatory
in nature.
A. The Inherent Uncertainty of Reasonableness
In the EqA, the divide between reasonable and unreasonable separates cases
in which failure to make an adjustment results in liability for discrimination
from those in which it does not. Nevertheless, determining exactly where
that divide lies can be difficult. This problem is not unique to the EqA.
In the US, it has been described as the “great unsettled question”68 of the
Americans with Disabilities Act 1990 – the associated uncertainty attracting
concerns about conflicting expectations and understandings, risks of
increased litigation and burdens for businesses.69
Uncertainty in the operation of reasonable adjustment or accommodation
duties even underpins calls for their abolition. Richard Epstein, for
example, argues that “the utter want of precision is . . . a reason for jettison-
ing the system altogether”.70 Admittedly, the focus of this argument is the
employment context, but it seems likely that duties requiring providers of
services or public functions to make reasonable adjustments would be
viewed in the same way.
Conversely, the uncertainty and compromise inherent in the concept of
reasonableness have also attracted criticism from proponents of the com-
plete removal of all disabling barriers.71 Their concerns include the fact
that reasonable adjustment duties accept ableist norms as their starting
point and thereby legitimise them, and that questions of reasonableness
(on which hang far-reaching implications for equality and inclusion) are
left to be decided by judges who may have very little familiarity with
68 P.S. Karlen and G. Rutherglen, “Disabilities, Discrimination, and Reasonable Accommodation” (1996)
46 Duke Law Journal 1, 8.
69 See e.g. C.L. Weaver, “Incentives Versus Controls in Federal Disability Policy” in C.L. Weaver (ed.),
Disability and Work: Incentives, Rights and Opportunities (Lanham and London 1991), 9–11; S.B.
Epstein, “In Search of a Bright Line: Determining when an Employer’s Hardship Becomes ‘Undue’
under the Americans with Disabilities Act” (1995) 48 Vanderbilt Law Review 391; and R. Epstein,
Forbidden Grounds: The Case Against Employment Discrimination Laws (Cambridge 1992), 489–91.
70 Epstein, Forbidden Grounds, at 489–90.
71 See e.g. S. Prideaux, Good Practice for Providing Reasonable Access to the Physical Built Environment
for Disabled People (Leeds 2006), 38–39.
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disability.72 Pearson has therefore argued that the anticipatory reasonable
adjustment duty should be abandoned and replaced by an entitlement to
“rightful access”, without any “reasonableness” or “undue burden”
limitation.73
The uncertainty associated with “reasonableness”, however, is a corol-
lary of the flexibility that allows reasonable adjustment duties to respond
to the particular circumstances of each individual case. This flexibility, at
least in reasonable adjustment duties with a reactive dimension, allows
account to be taken of the variation in impairments and the types of mea-
sures needed to remove the disadvantage that a particular disabled individ-
ual would otherwise face. It also allows account to be taken of the nature,
size and available resource of the particular duty-bearer. For these reasons,
Lawson and Liisberg have both argued that duties such as the EqA’s antici-
patory reasonable adjustment duty have important roles to play in disability
equality law, whilst urging that care should be taken to limit uncertainty
wherever practicable.74
One important way in which problems of uncertainty can be limited is by
the provision of clear, detailed and influential guidance to which judges will
have regard when determining questions of reasonableness. The EqA itself
is silent on how questions of reasonableness should be determined but some
guidance is provided by the statutory Code of Practice on Services and
Public Functions.75 This notes that the question of whether steps are reason-
able is an objective question for courts to decide76 and that it depends on all
the circumstances of the case, including:
. the type of service being provided;
. the nature of the service provider and its size and resources; and
. the effect of the disability on the individual disabled person.77
It also suggests that factors likely to be relevant to assessments of whether
an adjustment is reasonable include its effectiveness in overcoming the rele-
vant disadvantage; its practicability, cost, disruptiveness; and the resources
of the duty-bearer, and availability of financial or other assistance for mak-
ing the adjustment.78
The purpose of the duty, according to the Code, is “to ensure that dis-
abled people are not placed at a substantial disadvantage compared with
non-disabled people when using a service”.79 The Code also emphasises,
72 See the discussion of this issue in Lawson, Disability and Equality Law in Britain, 285–86.
73 Pearson, “What’s Worth Got to Do with It?”.
74 See e.g. Lawson, Disability and Equality Law in Britain, ch. 6.5; and Liisberg, “Accessibility of
Services and Discrimination”.
75 EHRC Code, particularly ch. 7.
76 Ibid., at [7.33].
77 Ibid., at [7.29].
78 Ibid., at [7.30].
79 Ibid., at [7.35].
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in line with case law, that the “policy of the Act is not a minimalist policy
of simply ensuring that some access is available to disabled people; it is, so
far as is reasonably practicable, to approximate the access enjoyed by dis-
abled people to that enjoyed by the rest of the public”.80
Despite such guidance, some uncertainty about whether particular adjust-
ments are reasonable or not inevitably persists, as recognised by relevant
parliamentary committees81 and by studies in fields such as healthcare,82
tertiary education,83 live entertainment84 and the justice system.85 This
begs questions as to whether there is a need for additional measures gener-
ating greater clarity and certainty, albeit at the expense of losing some
flexibility. One such measure might be rules or presumptions that certain
types of steps should always or never be regarded as reasonable. Section
22(2)(a) of the EqA provides a means by which this might happen. It allows
for the introduction of regulations specifying “circumstances in which it is,
or in which it is not, reasonable for a person of a prescribed description to
have to take steps of a prescribed description”. Numerous calls for the
introduction of such measures were made to the House of Lords
Committee in 2015–16. These included calls for “explicit standards for
the built environment and the delivery of services”;86 regulations specifying
that shops, restaurants and other service providers are obliged to admit
assistance dogs;87 and legislation to clarify the meaning of “reasonable
adjustments” in the context of deaf people using British Sign
Language.88 The Committee, however, rejected such calls for fear that
they might unhelpfully restrict the flexibility of the reasonable adjustment
duty.89
The House of Lords Committee’s reluctance to recommend regulations
that would introduce greater certainty into the operation of the reasonable
80 Ibid., at [7.4].
81 See notes 12–17 above and accompanying text.
82 See e.g. S. Read et al., “Disabled People’s Experiences of Accessing Reasonable Adjustments in
Hospitals: A Qualitative Study” (2018) 18 BMC Health Service Research, available at https://
bmchealthservres.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s12913-018-3757-7 (last accessed 8 April
2021), 2.
83 See e.g. H. Cameron et al., “Equality Law Obligations in Higher Education: Reasonable Adjustments
under the Equality Act 2010 in Assessment of Students with Unseen Disabilities” (2019) 39 Legal
Studies 204.
84 See e.g. S. Bunbury, “An Analysis of the Service Provider’s Legal Duty to Make Reasonable
Adjustments: The Little Mix Saga” (2020) 18 The Entertainment and Sports Law Journal 2.
85 See e.g. P. Swift et al., “What Happens When People with Learning Disabilities Need Advice about the
Law?” (2013) Norah Fry Research Centre, available at https://legalservicesboard.org.uk/research/
reports/what-happens-when-people-with-learning-disabilities-need-advice-about-the-law (last accessed
8 April 2021); and EHRC, “Inclusive Justice: A System Designed for All” (2020), available at
https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/en/publication-download/inclusive-justice-system-designed-all
(last accessed 8 April 2021).
86 House of Lords Committee, “The Equality Act 2010”, [210] referring to written evidence submitted by
Portsmouth Disability Forum.
87 Ibid., at [210] referring to written evidence submitted by Guide Dogs for the Blind Association.
88 Ibid., at [211] referring to written evidence submitted by British Deaf Association.
89 Ibid., at [217].
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adjustment duty is, we suggest, less persuasive in the context of the antici-
patory reasonable adjustment duty than it is in the context of the reactive
duty. For the latter, responsiveness to the particular circumstances of the
individual disabled person in the specific case is critical. The emphasis
of the former, however, is on duty-bearers taking reasonable steps to
remove a disadvantage that would otherwise be encountered by broad
groups of disabled people, rather than on responding to the particularities
of the specific case in question. This emphasis on groups rather than indi-
viduals would seem to make it possible to supplement the wide-ranging
flexible duty based on reasonableness with regulations that generate some
degree of certainty – including by specifying steps that would always,
never or generally be reasonable for certain types of duty-bearers to take.
Examples might include situations in which it would always be reasonable
for providers of public functions or services to offer communication in
British Sign Language and situations in which it would always be reason-
able for certain types of providers of public functions or services to permit
access to assistance dogs.
This said, considerable care needs to be taken to ensure that any such
regulations increase certainty in ways that make a positive contribution to
disability equality and that implementing the requirements they impose is
practicable for those to whom they apply – as well as being effectively mon-
itored and enforced. The only regulations to have been issued to date on the
question of reasonableness, the Equality Act 2010 (Disability) Regulations
2010, demonstrate some of the problems that can attend the introduction of
regulations. These regulations operate in reasonable adjustment disputes
involving providers of services or public functions and focus on whether
adjustments should be made to physical features. They effectively create
a 10-year exemption from liability, specifying that for 10 years after the
installation of the contested physical feature, any adjustments to it will
not be regarded as reasonable – provided that it was installed “for the pur-
pose of assisting people to have access to the building or . . . facilities pro-
vided in the building” and in accordance with Part M (Access to and Use of
Buildings) of the Building Regulations 2010.90 As the Women and
Equalities Committee pointed out, although the scope of this exemption
is relatively narrow, the fact that it is based on compliance with the now
very outdated Part M standards is highly problematic.91 It thus provides
an example of the unhelpful ossification that can occur when interpretations
of “reasonableness” are linked to specific sets of technical standards – par-
ticularly when those standards are not regularly updated.
The fact that there are problems with the 2010 Regulations, however, is
not a reason for rejecting the possibility that other, more carefully crafted,
90 See in particular Equality Act 2010 (Disability) Regulations 2010, reg. 9 and para. 1 of the schedule.
91 Women and Equalities Committee, “Building for Equality”, [134].
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regulations might play a useful role in reducing some of the uncertainty
associated with the anticipatory reasonable adjustment duty. Consultation
and involvement of disabled people’s organisations and other stakeholders
will obviously be key to the development of successful and effective
regulations.92 Disability equality law in Norway provides a good example
of a system in which such regulations play a key role – laying out
accessibility standards and specifying that non-compliance with them
constitutes unlawful discrimination.93
We therefore argue that more attention should be given to the possibility
of using section 22 of the EqA to introduce regulations about how “reason-
able” should be interpreted. This would help to clarify expectations and
give greater certainty to duty-bearers and disabled people alike. This may
itself reduce the need for litigation. Where enforcement action is needed,
however, the mechanism would be the same as for the enforcement of
the anticipatory reasonable adjustment duty more generally. As discussed
in Section V below, this enforcement mechanism is currently beset by a
number of very serious problems. Unless and until these can be resolved,
thought should be given to setting out relevant standards in new pieces
of legislation (separate from the EqA) which establish simpler and cheaper
enforcement mechanisms, not so heavily dependent on action by individual
disabled claimants. This would also provide an important opportunity to
expand the scope of what is regulated to include the sale or distribution
of goods – an issue which currently falls outside the scope of the EqA.
A recent and interesting example of an approach which provides add-
itional clarity to the operation of the anticipatory reasonable adjustment
duty, without using section 22 regulations and which also introduces new
awareness-raising, monitoring and enforcement mechanisms, is the Public
Sector Bodies (Websites and Mobile Applications) (No. 2) Accessibility
Regulations 2018. These regulations were introduced into UK law in
order to ensure compliance with EU law.94 They specify that failure to
meet relevant accessibility requirements (based on making websites and
apps “perceivable, operable, understandable and robust”)95 – or to provide
information in alternative formats – should be treated as a breach of the
EqA’s reasonable adjustment duty.96 They give the role of enforcing
these accessibility requirements to the EHRC.97 In addition, they require
public sector bodies to publish “accessibility statements”, which identify
92 A point stressed over a decade ago by Gooding and Casserley, “Open for All?”, s. 4.1.
93 For further discussion, see e.g. Liisberg, “Accessibility of Services and Discrimination”.
94 Directive (EU) 2016/2102 (OJ 2016 L 327 p.1) on the accessibility of the websites and mobile applica-
tions of public sector bodies.
95 Public Sector Bodies (Websites and Mobile Applications) Accessibility Regulations 2018, SI 2018/852,
reg. 3. The harmonised standards mentioned in regulation 9, are set out in ETSI EN 301 549 –
Accessibility Requirements for ICT Products and Services.
96 Ibid., reg. 12.
97 Ibid., reg. 11.
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and give reasons for any respects in which the website is not fully access-
ible, give details of how individuals can seek accessibility-related help from
the website host and how they can notify them, and the relevant enforce-
ment body of problems and non-compliance.98 The Cabinet Office is
required to carry out regular compliance monitoring of public sector
websites99 and given responsibilities for enforcing accessibility state-
ments.100 These regulations help give additional clarity and certainty to
the reasonable adjustment duty in public sector cases. Their influence is
also likely to extend, albeit indirectly, into anticipatory reasonable adjust-
ment cases where the duty-bearer is a private sector body. The fact that
they shift responsibility for compliance monitoring and enforcement
away from disabled individuals is also potentially very significant. The
long-term impact of these regulations, however, will depend on issues
such as the ongoing commitment of the UK Government to this process
after Brexit, the communication between the governmental compliance
monitors and the EHRC enforcers, and the place of website-accessibility
enforcement in the EHRC’s strategy and resource allocation.101
In summary, while the concept of reasonableness gives the anticipatory
reasonable adjustment duty valuable breadth and flexibility, we suggest that
its operation would be enhanced by the additional certainty that would
come from carefully crafted regulations or standards for specific types of
steps or situations. Furthermore, as discussed above,102 increasing the
prominence of relevant guidance by including it in a separate code of prac-
tice on reasonable adjustments would help disabled people and possibly
also duty-bearers to locate, understand and use it.
B. The Extent of Obligations to Take Reactive or Responsive Steps as Part
of the Anticipatory Reasonable Adjustment Duty
It is clear that the anticipatory reasonable adjustment duty has a strong pro-
active dimension and that, as explained in Section II above, it is owed to
disabled people generally rather than a particular disabled person. As
noted by Jackson M.R., this means that, when determining whether reason-
able adjustments have been made, judges must have regard to the needs of
the relevant group of disabled people (for instance, people who are deaf)
and not solely the needs of the specific individual in question.103 It thus
requires action in advance of a complaint or request by any particular
98 Ibid., reg. 8.
99 Ibid., reg. 10.
100 Ibid., reg. 14.
101 See further S. Lewthwaite and A. James, “Accessible at Last?: What Do New European Digital
Accessibility Laws Mean for Disabled People in the UK?” (2020) 35 Disability & Society 1360.
102 Section III(B) above.
103 Finnigan v Chief Constable of Northumbria Police [2013] EWCA Civ 1191, [2014] 1 W.L.R. 445, at
[31].
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disabled individual. Despite this, section 21 of the EqA provides that it can
be enforced only by an individual who has experienced a relevant substan-
tial disadvantage.
The fact that the enforcement of the anticipatory duty is so firmly placed
in the hands of particular individuals, who must themselves have been dis-
advantaged by the failure of a duty-bearer to make reasonable adjustments,
suggests that the duty might include obligations to take steps to respond to
the particular circumstances of the individual in question even though it
may not have been possible for the duty-bearer to anticipate those circum-
stances. The EqA does not address this issue explicitly, however, and it is
from this that the uncertainty about the extent to which the anticipatory duty
includes obligations to make reactive or responsive adjustments springs.
Nevertheless, it is clear that the CRPD’s reactive or responsive reasonable
accommodation duty extends to the provision of services and public func-
tions.104 Accordingly, although there is a lack of clarity in the wording of
the EqA, consistency with the CRPD demands an interpretation whereby
the anticipatory duty includes a reactive dimension imposing duties to
respond to the specific and unanticipated circumstances of the particular
case.105
The anticipatory duty has been so interpreted in guidance issued by the
EHRC. The statutory Code, for instance, includes the observation that
[o]nce a service provider has become aware of the requirements of a particular
disabled person who uses or seeks to use its services, it might then be reason-
able for the service provider to take a particular step to meet these require-
ments . . . especially . . . where a disabled person has pointed out the
difficulty that they face in accessing services, or has suggested a reasonable
solution to that difficulty.106
Beyond this, however, the Code offers little additional guidance on the
reactive dimension of the anticipatory duty. Much fuller guidance on the
matter is provided in non-statutory technical guidance.107
The fact that the anticipatory reasonable adjustment duty also contains
obligations to make adjustments that are responsive, rather than anticipa-
tory, suggests that referring to it as the “anticipatory” duty may itself be
a cause of confusion – suggesting that there is no reactive element.
Nevertheless, there has to date been little concern about whether the duty
104 See generally CRPD Committee, “General Comment No. 6”.
105 For detailed analysis of situations in which judges may draw on the CRPD to interpret domestic legis-
lation, see A. Lawson and L. Series, “The United Kingdom” in L. Waddington and A. Lawson (eds.),
The UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in Practice: A Comparative Analysis of
the Role of Courts (Oxford 2018).
106 EHRC Code, [7.26].
107 EHRC, “Equality Act 2010: Technical Guidance on Further and Higher Education” (2014), available at
https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/en/publication-download/
equality-act-2010-technical-guidance-further-and-higher-education (last accessed 8 April 2021), [7.62]–
[7.68].
C.L.J. 325The Anticipatory Reasonable Adjustment Duty
use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0008197321000568
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 94.2.81.21, on 12 Aug 2021 at 15:02:38, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of
includes a responsive dimension – the general assumption seeming to be
that it does.108 This may in part be because there is greater familiarity
with the way in which the reasonable adjustment duty operates in employ-
ment cases, and an assumption that similar principles apply in contexts of
services and public functions.
Accordingly, EHRC guidance goes some way to addressing the uncer-
tainty associated with the EqA’s lack of clarity about the existence and
nature of the responsive elements of the anticipatory duty. The effectiveness
of this guidance depends on the clarity and detail of the guidance and on
levels of awareness of its existence. In the statutory Code, the level of detail
is minimal.
V. ENFORCEMENT PROBLEMS
The enforcement of the anticipatory reasonable adjustment duty has been
hampered by a range of factors. For current purposes, these have been
grouped into two broad categories, discussed in Sections V(A) and V(B),
respectively.
Section V(A) is concerned with the enforcement of the EqA and its antici-
patory reasonable adjustment duty in the context of services and public func-
tions. EqA cases on services and public functions are heard in the first
instance by county courts in England and Wales and sheriff courts in
Scotland.109 Discrimination claims relating to employment, on the other
hand, are heard by employment tribunals. Contrasts between these two
types of forums have prompted three main types of concerns about the
enforcement of non-employment cases – costs, lack of judicial expertise
and inadequate reporting of judgments. After addressing each of these issues,
attention will turn to enforcement problems specific to the anticipatory duty.
Section V(B) is concerned with the enforcement of the EqA more
broadly – not simply in relation to the anticipatory duty or services and
public functions. Any reflection on the enforcement of the anticipatory rea-
sonable adjustment duty would be incomplete without some acknowledge-
ment of these more general enforcement problems. In order to maintain
focus, however, discussion will necessarily be brief.
A. Enforcement Issues with Particular Relevance to the Anticipatory
Reasonable Adjustment Duty and Services and Public Functions Cases
1. Costs of bringing cases
The cost of bringing non-employment discrimination cases, including for
breach of the anticipatory duty, is one of the biggest barriers in the way
108 See e.g. Cameron et al., “Equality Law Obligations in Higher Education”.
109 Equality Act 2010, s. 114(1).
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of such litigation.110 In 2019, the EHRC indicated that it paid an average of
about £28,000 on supporting each individual discrimination case.111 This
figure includes costs such as legal advice, representation and court fees.
The potential deterrent impact of the costs of litigation may be gauged
by the dramatic fall in the number of cases taken to the employment tribu-
nal when fees were payable;112 and the fact that, after such fees were abol-
ished, the number of cases nearly doubled.113
The cost of bringing a case for breach of the anticipatory duty depends
on the value of the claim, the track to which it is allocated, and whether
it goes to trial.114 This complexity makes it difficult to predict the cost of
bringing a case, which may itself have a deterrent effect on potential clai-
mants. Also relevant is the fact that, because damages awarded to success-
ful claimants in services cases are relatively low, they may well be less than
the cost of bringing the case.115
The imposition of fees for employment tribunal cases116 was ruled to be
unlawful by the Supreme Court in R. (on the application of UNISON) v
Lord Chancellor.117 This ruling drew heavily on principles of access to
justice under EU law and the common law right of access to a court.
This common law right was subsequently used, but without success, to
challenge the problems faced by discrimination claimants in
non-employment cases in R. (on the application of Leighton) v the Lord
Chancellor.118 Fees thus remain payable for EqA cases in county and
sheriff courts. Although the CRPD Committee has recommended that dis-
abled people bringing discrimination cases should not have to pay court
fees,119 arguments based on the CRPD in Leighton fell on hard ground.120
The Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012
(LASPO) has exacerbated problems for discrimination claimants in county
and sheriff courts in a number of ways. First, courts can no longer require
110 Women and Equalities Committee, “Enforcing the Equality Act 2010”, [193].
111 Ibid., at [193].
112 R (on the application of UNISON) v Lord Chancellor [2017] UKSC 51, [2017] 3 W.L.R. 409, at [38]–
[39], referencing Ministry of Justice, “Review of the Introduction of Fees in the Employment Tribunals:
Consultation on Proposals for Reform” (31 January 2017), Cm 9373, [105].
113 From around 4,200 claims in the second quarter of 2014–15, to 8,173 claims in the third quarter of 2017–
18: Ministry of Justice, “Tribunals and Gender Recognition Certificate Statistics Quarterly: October to
December 2017” (2018), available at https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/tribunals-and-gender-
recognition-certificate-statistics-quarterly-october-to-december-2017 (last accessed 8 April 2021), 6–7.
114 Sheriff Court Fees Order 2018, SI 2018/81, Sched. 2; Civil Proceedings Fees Order 2008, SI 2008/1053,
Sched. 1.
115 These points were made on behalf of the claimant in R. (on the application of Leighton) v the Lord
Chancellor [2020] EWHC 336, [2020] A.C.D. 50, at [37]; see also Section V(A)(4) below.
116 Such fees were introduced by the Employment Tribunals and the Employment Appeal Tribunal Fees
Order 2013.
117 [2017] UKSC 51, [2017] 3 W.L.R. 409.
118 [2020] EWHC 336. Cavanagh J. (e.g. at [148], [151], [161]) distinguished the Unison case from the one
before him.
119 CRPD Committee, “Concluding Observations on the United Kingdom” (CRPD/C/UK/CO/1, 2017), [32
(c)], [33(c)].
120 Leighton v Lord Chancellor [2020] EWHC 336, at [216]–[221].
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an unsuccessful defendant to pay the “success fee” to which a claimant’s law-
yers may be entitled under a conditional fee agreement,121 giving lawyers
less security that they will be paid and thus making it more difficult for clai-
mants to find lawyers willing to represent them. Second, courts can no longer
require unsuccessful defendants to pay the cost of claimants’ after-the-event
(ATE) insurance premiums122 – insurance, often prohibitively expensive,
against the risk of having to pay the defendant’s costs. Hence, while the
defendant may be ordered to pay a successful claimant’s costs, considerable
financial risk remains with the claimant in respect of liability for success fees
and ATE premiums. If unsuccessful, claimants of course risk not just having
to pay their own costs, but also being ordered to pay those of the defend-
ant.123 This risk is particularly acute for claimants in non-employment dis-
crimination cases because in county and sheriff courts, unlike employment
tribunals, such cost orders are not confined to exceptional circumstances
involving unreasonable behaviour.124 Further, the sums involved may be
high – large enough “to wipe out the cost of somebody’s home”.125
While LASPO addressed these problems for personal injury cases by
introducing a system of qualified one-way cost-shifting (QOCS), it did
not extend this safeguard to discrimination cases. Despite repeated recom-
mendations that QOCS be extended to discrimination cases,126 and a 2019
review of LASPO,127 this has not yet happened. The Government’s failure
to take this action was challenged in the Leighton case.128 Although
Cavanagh J. dismissed the case because the Government was still actively
considering whether to extend QOCS in this way, he indicated that ongoing
governmental inactivity might ultimately provide grounds for judicial
review.129 The primary reason given by the Government for its delay
was the lack of significant statistical evidence on the impact of LASPO,
and the unavailability of QOCS, on discrimination cases.130 Nevertheless,
it seems clear from what Cavanagh J. describes as “primarily anecdotal”131
121 Courts and Legal Services Act 1990, s. 58A(6) (amended by LASPO, s. 44(4)).
122 Ibid., s. 58C(1) (inserted by LASPO, s. 46(1)).
123 Women and Equalities Committee, “Enforcing the Equality Act 2010”, [193], [208].
124 Ibid., at [209].
125 N. Whitingham, cited ibid., at [209].
126 House of Lords Committee, “The Equality Act 2010”, [395]–[402]; Women and Equalities Committee,
“Enforcing the Equality Act 2010”, [210]–[212]; and EHRC, “Response of the Equality and Human
Rights Commission to the Post-implementation Review of Part 2 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and
Punishment of Offenders Act 2012” (2018), available at https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/sites/
default/files/consultation-response-on-post-implementation-review-of-part-2-laspo-7-september-2018.
pdf (last accessed 8 April 2021).
127 Ministry of Justice, “Post-implementation Review of Part 2 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and
Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 (LASPO): Civil Litigation Funding and Costs” (2019), CP 38, avail-
able at https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
file/777039/post-implementation-review-of-part-2-of-laspo.pdf (last accessed 8 April 2021).
128 Leighton v Lord Chancellor [2020] EWHC 336.
129 Ibid., at [65].
130 See e.g. the argument reported ibid., at [46].
131 Ibid., at [129]; see also at [211].
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evidence that the impact has been severe. Such evidence has come from
disabled people’s organisations132 and also from lawyers. The following
is a powerful example of the latter:
I note from my own experience that whilst I undertook many disability dis-
crimination claims in the county court in the years up to 2013, after that
point they fell off a cliff. Yet the problems that disabled people face have
not gone away: instead disabled people deprived of a means of defraying
their potential costs liabilities, face a locked and bolted door into court, pre-
cluding them from using litigation to get redress.133
2. Lack of judicial experience and expertise
Compared with judges in employment tribunals, judges in county and
sheriff courts are likely to have less familiarity with, and expertise in, equal-
ity law concepts including reasonable adjustments.134 They tend to be legal
generalists and, because relatively few EqA cases come before them,135 do
not have the opportunity to develop significant expertise in the area.
Accordingly, in 2020, the Law Commission recommended a system of
“flexible deployment”, whereby employment tribunal judges with equality
law experience could, in appropriate circumstances, be deployed to hear
EqA cases in county courts.136 While this recommendation is to be wel-
comed in general terms, it is likely to be of very limited help in relation
to the anticipatory reasonable adjustment duty. This is because expertise
in employment discrimination will entail familiarity with the reactive rea-
sonable adjustment duty. The anticipatory duty, however, is not relevant
in the employment context and is therefore not part of the EqA to which
judges will routinely be exposed in employment tribunals. Alongside this
initiative, we therefore urge that specific judicial training on the anticipatory
reasonable adjustment duty is essential.
Concerns about lack of equality expertise in county and sheriff courts, as
well as concern about the costs of such proceedings,137 have prompted calls
for the setting up of low cost specialist bodies to replace or supplement
them. Thus, prior to the EqA, the House of Commons Work and
Pensions Committee recommended the introduction of a specialist equality
132 See e.g. Inclusion London’s “Disability Justice Project”, available at https://www.disabilityjustice.org.
uk/ (last accessed 2 January 2021).
133 A. Hogan, “Disability Discrimination and QOCS: Andrew Hogan’s Blog on Costs and Litigation
Funding” (2020), available at https://costsbarrister.co.uk/access-to-justice/disability-discrimination-and-
qocs/ (last accessed 26 May 2021).
134 Law Commission, “Employment Law Hearing Structures: Report” (2020) HC 308, available at “https://
www.gov.uk/government/publications/employment-law-hearing-structures-report” (last accessed 8 April
2021), [3.7], [3.83].
135 No statistics are published but in Leighton v Lord Chancellor [2020] EWHC 336, at [38], the claimant’s
solicitor estimated that there were approximately 100 such discrimination cases each year.
136 Law Commission, “Employment Law Hearing Structures”, [3.95]–[3.101].
137 See the discussion of cost-related concerns in Section V(A)(1) above.
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tribunal to hear all EqA cases.138 No such tribunal has been introduced
however, and the Law Commission has acknowledged the strength of coun-
terarguments based on the potential negative impact of moving equality
cases and associated expertise out of mainstream courts and tribunals.139
Importantly though, without training and other initiatives to build equality
law expertise across the judicial mainstream, such counterarguments lose
much of their power.
Another idea, mooted by the House of Lords Committee, was the cre-
ation of a disability ombudsman. While there was some support for such
an approach, the Committee was persuaded by arguments that the multipli-
city of existing ombudsmen was creating confusion and that a better
approach would be to embed equality expertise within existing bodies
and services.140
3. Limited reporting of judgments
Unlike employment tribunal judgments, county and sheriff court judgments
are not routinely published. This makes it difficult to gauge the number,
nature and focus of non-employment cases. As the Women and
Equalities Committee has pointed out, this absence of data makes it impos-
sible for the EHRC to identify emerging patterns and problem issues and
thus weakens the evidence base from which it can draw to inform its
enforcement activities.141 Another example of the problems caused by a
lack of relevant data, explained in Section V(A)(1) above, is that the impact
of LASPO, and the unavailability of QOCS, on non-employment discrim-
ination cases is unclear. The Government’s reliance on this lack of data as a
reason for delaying action intended to mitigate the obvious financial deter-
rents to bringing such cases is so unfair on claimants, and so antithetical to
the aims of embedding equality in services and public functions, as to be
perverse.
The problems associated with lack of reporting of county and sheriff
court judgments do not fall evenly across the EqA. They have particular
significance for those elements, including the anticipatory reasonable
adjustment duty, which operate only in non-employment contexts and
thus fall outside the jurisdiction of employment tribunals (the
judgments of which are reported). Reporting county and sheriff court
cases, a practice strongly recommended by the Women and Equalities
138 House of Commons Work and Pensions Committee, “The Equality Bill: How Disability Equality Fits
Within a Single Equality Act” (2009) HC 158-I, available at https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/
cm200809/cmselect/cmworpen/158/158i.pdf (last accessed 11 April 2021), [265]; see also Lawson,
Disability and Equality Law in Britain, 280–81.
139 Law Commission, “Employment Law Hearing Structures, [3.8], [3.11].
140 House of Lords Committee, “The Equality Act 2010”, [453]–[462].
141 Women and Equalities Committee, “Enforcing the Equality Act 2010”, [217]–[219]; see also EHRC,
“Access to Legal Aid for Discrimination Cases” (2019), available at https://www.equalityhumanrights.
com/en/publication-download/access-legal-aid-discrimination-cases (last accessed 11 April 2021), 35.
330 [2021]The Cambridge Law Journal
use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0008197321000568
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 94.2.81.21, on 12 Aug 2021 at 15:02:38, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of
Committee,142 is a “simple change that can enable individual litigation to
achieve wider change”.143
4. Under-use of injunctive remedies for breach of the anticipatory duty
As explained above,144 the anticipatory reasonable adjustment duty is pro-
active, requiring duty-bearers to monitor constantly how they deliver their
services and public functions and take reasonable steps to make them
disability-inclusive. Its focus is on systemic change and the removal of bar-
riers that disadvantage disabled people beyond the particular claimant. As
stressed in argument in Leighton, anticipatory reasonable adjustment duties
“are directed towards achieving equal access to service provision for all dis-
abled persons” and therefore
unlike discrimination claims in other fields, the main objective is not usually to
obtain damages or some other remedy for an individual in relation to an inci-
dent that happened in the past, but, rather, the main objective is to make things
better in the future for the whole cohort of persons who share the claimant’s
protected characteristic, and who are disadvantaged by the impediment in
issue.145
It might therefore be expected that, where courts find the duty has been
breached, injunctive relief would regularly be ordered. The importance of
such forward-looking remedies in cases of systemic discrimination has
been stressed in guidance from the CRPD Committee.146 On the basis of
this guidance, the fact that a disabled person can seek injunctive (or indeed
any other) relief for breach of the EqA anticipatory duty only if they have
actually experienced a disadvantage is highly problematic as it means that
there is no way of using the duty to halt the installation of exclusionary sys-
tems or infrastructures at an early stage of development.
County and sheriff courts, unlike employment tribunals, do have the
power to grant injunctions (interdicts or specific implements in
Scotland).147 A notable example of an anticipatory reasonable adjustment
case in which this occurred is Royal Bank of Scotland v Allen,148 where
the Court of Appeal upheld an order that the defendant should install a plat-
form lift in order to enable the claimant, and other wheelchair users, to
access its services. More recently, a similar injunction was awarded against
a restaurant in the unreported case of Lawson v Abbey Wharf Restaurant.149
142 Women and Equalities Committee, “Enforcing the Equality Act 2010”, [218]–[219] and rec. 38.
143 Ibid., at [217].
144 See Section II(B) above.
145 Leighton v Lord Chancellor [2020] EWHC 336, at [36].
146 CRPD Committee, “General Comment No. 2”, [22].
147 County Courts Act 1984, s. 38; Supreme Court Act 1981, s. 37(1); Sheriff Courts (Scotland) Act 1907,
s. 6(e); Courts Reform (Scotland) Act 2014, Sched. 1, s. 6.
148 [2009] EWCA Civ 1213.
149 York County Court, 28 February 2020.
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The fact that county and sheriff court judgments are not reported makes it
difficult to ascertain exactly how many successful anticipatory reasonable
adjustment cases result in injunctive relief. Nevertheless, it is clear that it
is a rarity in reported cases and it seems unlikely that the situation will
be very different in unreported cases. This contrasts markedly with the
US approach where the standard remedy for breach of the reasonable mod-
ification duty is injunctive relief and it is not possible to award damages to
individual claimants.150
The House of Lords Committee suggested that one likely cause of the
limited use of injunctive relief in EqA cases was the fact that disabled clai-
mants and their legal representatives were often unaware that they could
request such relief.151 For this reason, it called for relevant court documents
and guidance to highlight the power of county and sheriff courts to award
injunctive relief in EqA cases.152 Such guidance should also make it clear
that requests for injunctive relief will generally be difficult to negotiate
without legal representation and that expert evidence will also often be
needed – both of which will push up litigation costs.
More injunctive relief in anticipatory reasonable adjustment cases would
enhance the social impact of litigation brought by individual disabled clai-
mants. It should not, however, be regarded as a panacea. Ensuring that
injunctions are in fact carried out may present challenges for courts.153
Injunctions are also limited in that they must relate specifically to the par-
ticular complaint, with the result that they are unlikely to require general
measures, such as disability equality training.154 Nor do county or sheriff
courts have the power to issue recommendations for wider organisational
or sectoral change – a situation which the Women and Equalities
Committee has rightly urged should be changed.155
B. Enforcement Issues Relating to Equality Act Discrimination Claims
More Broadly
1. Limited access to legal aid and advice
Despite the fact that LASPO did not withdraw legal aid funding from dis-
crimination cases, its reforms have made it more difficult for victims of all
types of discrimination, including breaches of the anticipatory reasonable
150 Americans with Disabilities Act 1990, 42 USC s. 12188(a)(2). Under 42 USC s. 12188(b), however,
fines may be imposed in cases brought by the Attorney-General. See generally Blanck, Disability
Law and Policy, ch. 12.8.
151 House of Lords Committee, “The Equality Act 2010”, [423].
152 Ibid.
153 See further D. Barrett, “The Regulatory Space of Equality and Human Rights in Britain: The Role of the
Equality and Human Rights Commission” (2019) 39 Legal Studies 247, 252–53.
154 This point was made by the DRC in its Initial Submission to the Discrimination Law Review (London
2006), [2.3.2].
155 Women and Equalities Committee, “Enforcing the Equality Act 2010”, [225].
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adjustment duty, to access legal aid and advice.156 A particularly significant
barrier for many disabled claimants was LASPO’s introduction of a man-
datory telephone gateway for individuals wishing to access legal aid.157
The difficulties posed by this communication method for people with a
range of impairments (including hearing impairments, mental health condi-
tions and learning difficulties), exacerbated by failures to make effective
reasonable adjustments to the system, led the EHRC to conclude that the
gateway operated in a manner amounting to disability discrimination con-
trary to the EqA’s anticipatory reasonable adjustment duty.158 These pro-
blems have now been largely addressed because, in May 2020, the
Government removed the obligatory nature of the gateway.159
LASPO also caused a dramatic reduction in the availability of legal
advice on issues such as discrimination. This came about, in part, due to
the closure of many organisations providing legal advice because of
LASPO’s severe cuts to the legal aid budget160 and its restrictions on con-
ditional fee agreements and ATE insurance policies.161 Consequently, as
Douglas Johnson reported to the House of Lords Committee: “[t]here are
precious few firms of solicitors in the country that will go anywhere near
a discrimination case. . . . It is simply not cost effective for most firms of
solicitors to take that risk from a business sense.”162 It is therefore unsur-
prising that the enforcement of EqA rights, including its anticipatory
duty, currently depends very heavily on the deep commitment to disability
equality, as well as the business innovation and agility, of a small number
of law firms. The precarity inherent in such an approach is self-evident and,
as will be suggested below, is mitigated only partially by the support avail-
able from the EHRC and other regulators.
2. Under-use of enforcement mechanisms not dependent on individual
claimants
The enforcement problems addressed thus far all concern enforcement of
EqA rights by individual claimants. They highlight ways in which engaging
in discrimination litigation is unduly difficult or in which the impact of that
156 See e.g. EHRC, “Access to Legal Aid for Discrimination Cases”; and Joint Committee on Human
Rights, “Enforcing Human Rights” (2018) HC 669, available at https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/
jt201719/jtselect/jtrights/669/669.pdf (last accessed 11 April 2021), [33].
157 Introduced under LASPO, s. 2, and set out in the Civil Legal Aid (Procedure) Regulations 2012, pt. 2
(revoking the Civil Legal Aid (Procedure) (Amendment) Regulations 2020, reg. 5).
158 EHRC, “Access to Legal Aid for Discrimination Cases”, 7–8; EHRC, “Human Rights Review 2012:
How Fair is Britain? An Assessment of How Well Public Authorities Protect Human Rights” (2012),
available at https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/en/publication-download/human-rights-review-2012
(last accessed 11 April 2021), 255; see also Joint Committee on Human Rights, “Enforcing Human
Rights”, [49]–[51].
159 Ministry of Justice, Legal Support Action Plan: The Way Ahead, 7 February 2019, CP 40, 15.
160 See e.g. House of Lords Committee, “The Equality Act 2010”, [392]; and Women and Equalities
Committee, “Enforcing the Equality Act 2010”, [198].
161 Notes 122–125 above and accompanying text.
162 House of Lords Committee, “The Equality Act 2010”, [394].
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litigation is unhelpfully restrictive. Tackling these problems is important. Even
were they all to be successfully addressed, however, there would still be a
pressing need to look beyond enforcement by individual claimants toward
more systemic and strategic approaches. The Women and Equalities
Committee has expressed profound concern about the extent towhich enforce-
ment of the EqA has to date relied on enforcement by individuals. In its words,
“an approach that relies on individual disabled people bringing a challenge
each and every time they encounter a disabling barrier is neither morally
nor practically sustainable”;163 and we need “a fundamental shift in the way
that enforcement of the Equality Act is thought about and applied”.164
Any shift away from the current heavy dependence on individual
enforcement entails a strengthening of alternative approaches, amongst
which the powers of the EHRC are key. Duties imposed on the
Commission by the Equality Act 2006 include the enforcement of the
EqA.165 To discharge this duty, it is given power to assist a person who
is or may become a party in an EqA case by, for example, providing the
costs of legal advice and representation.166 Important though this power
is, it still ultimately depends on enforcement by individuals. In addition,
however, the Commission is given a range of enforcement powers to chal-
lenge unlawful acts (such as breaches of the anticipatory reasonable adjust-
ment duty) independently of litigation brought by individual claimants.167
The Commission has been criticised for making insufficient use of these
unique enforcement powers168 and for focusing too heavily on supporting
individual litigation.169 Persuaded by these concerns, the Women and
Equalities Committee has observed that “the burden of enforcement has
been borne by individuals, even where the EHRC has become involved”170
and that “this piece by piece approach is insufficient in the face of . . . sys-
temic and routine discrimination”.171
While there is scope for the EHRC to increase its use of the full range of
its enforcement powers, even given the dramatic shrinking of its resources
mentioned above,172 there are clearly limits on what it can be expected to
163 Women and Equalities Committee, “Building for Equality”, [12].
164 Women and Equalities Committee, “Enforcing the Equality Act 2010”, [23].
165 Equality Act 2006, s. 8(1)(c), (d) and (e), respectively.
166 Ibid., s. 28.
167 Ibid., ss. 20–27.
168 See e.g. House of Lords Committee, “The Equality Act 2010”, [126]–[127]; HM Government,
“Tailored Review of the Equality and Human Rights Commission” (2018), available at https://assets.
publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/756905/
EHRC-Tailored-Review-Nov18.pdf (last accessed 11 April 2021), 4; and Women and Equalities
Committee, “Enforcing the Equality Act 2010”, [43]–[45]; Joint Committee on Human Rights,
“Enforcing Human Rights”, [124]–[126].
169 Women and Equalities Committee, “Enforcing the Equality Act 2010”, [32]–[37].
170 Ibid., at [34].
171 Ibid., at [37].
172 See above note 67 and accompanying text. See also Joint Committee on Human Rights, “Enforcing
Human Rights”, [131]–[132].
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achieve. These expectations could be raised were there to be increases in its
resourcing and powers. However, this would not address the need for what
the Women and Equalities Committee has described as a “fundamental shift
in the burden of enforcement, with mainstream enforcement bodies taking
up the bulk of the work”.173 To achieve this, it recommended that each
government department should be required to ensure that all of its
sector-specific enforcement bodies (such as regulators, inspectorates and
ombud offices) are using their powers to bring about compliance with the
EqA.174 The EHRC should not only support such bodies in carrying out
this role, as argued by Barrett,175 but should actively challenge them
through enforcement action for any failure to discharge it adequately.176
VI. CONCLUSION
The anticipatory reasonable adjustment duty remains the principal legal tool
in the UK for embedding disability equality and inclusion into services and
public functions. The combination of factors discussed above, however, has
operated to reduce its profile and create a perfect storm against its effective-
ness and impact. Without action, its influence is likely to diminish further.
The price for this will be borne primarily by disabled people who will con-
tinue to be disadvantaged or excluded from services and public functions
which should be equally available to all. It will, to a lesser extent, also
fall on others who would benefit from more accessible and
disability-inclusive services and public functions – for example, people
with temporary injuries, older people, and parents or carers with pushchairs
and buggies.
The action required is not, in our view, the complete abolition and
replacement of the duty as proposed by Pearson.177 Its dependence on
notions of reasonableness, while imposing some limits and entailing a
degree of uncertainty and unpredictability, has the merit of flexibility and
responsiveness to the specific circumstances of a particular case. Further,
the fact that the duty is qualified by the limits of reasonableness means
that it is possible for the duty to have its current broad material scope –
applying as it does across the range of services offered to the public and
functions discharged by public authorities. These are important benefits
which do not need to be completely sacrificed in efforts to tackle the current
problems.
While the anticipatory duty should remain part of the solution, it is in
urgent need of reform. The most pressing of the problems it currently
173 Women and Equalities Committee, “Enforcing the Equality Act 2010”, [123].
174 Ibid., at [121].
175 Barrett, “The Regulatory Space of Equality and Human Rights in Britain”, 261–62.
176 Women and Equalities Committee, “Enforcing the Equality Act 2010”, [126]–[127].
177 Note 73 above and accompanying text.
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faces are those concerning enforcement. Helpful initiatives are afoot to give
sector regulators more responsibility for monitoring EqA compliance, into
which it is imperative that the anticipatory nature of the reasonable adjust-
ment duty for services and public functions is fully integrated. It seems
unlikely, however, that these will result in new quick, affordable and effec-
tive mechanisms for making complaints and seeking remedial action. The
primary complaint mechanism remains individual litigation in the county
and sheriff courts and, for the anticipatory reasonable adjustment duty,
this system is badly broken for the reasons discussed in Section V above.
It would improve, at least to some extent, were measures taken to extend
QOCS to discrimination cases; require more reporting of discrimination
case law; introduce better judicial training in this area; and enhance oper-
ational guidance on injunctive relief and make such relief available without
having to wait for a disabled person to experience actual disadvantage.
The anticipatory duty also needs to be made more visible. This could be
achieved by amendments to the EqA which could, for example, introduce a
new section 20A specifically on the anticipatory reasonable adjustment
duty. The duty would also benefit from greater certainty and clarity. In
terms of its general effect, it would be helpful to have greater clarity and
recognition of its reactive or responsive dimensions. More important, how-
ever, is the clarity that would come from statutory presumptions about what
would or would not be reasonable in particular types of setting or circum-
stance – a measure that could be achieved through the regulation-making
power conferred by section 22 of the EqA.
Useful though section 22 regulations would be in providing clear expec-
tations about what embedding disability equality in services and public
functions means, the enforcement of these expectations would be subject
to all the problems associated with enforcing the anticipatory reasonable
adjustment duty identified in Section V above. It is, of course, to be
hoped that action will be taken to address and mitigate these problems
but it seems likely that many will remain. It is therefore important, as
argued above,178 that thought be given to the introduction of new ways
of requiring services and public functions to be disability-inclusive – new
measures that would supplement and sit alongside the EqA anticipatory
duty, but with distinct monitoring, compliance and enforcement mechan-
isms. An obvious focus for such new requirements and mechanisms is
accessibility – in light of recent initiatives in other parts of the world,
such as the European Accessibility Act 2019179 and the Accessible
Canada Act 2018.180 Such a venture could impose requirements on
178 Notes 94–101 above and accompanying text.
179 Directive (EU) No 2019/882 (OJ 2019 L 151 p.70).
180 S.C. 2019, ch. 10.
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manufacturers and distributors of goods as well as services and thereby
address what remains a problematic gap in the coverage of the EqA.
To conclude, the anticipatory reasonable adjustment duty has important
work to do and, despite some successes, is failing to live up to its early
promise. Much the same might be said of the EqA generally, but the
blockages to success discussed above place the anticipatory duty at particu-
lar risk. Only if these are unblocked will the duty have a chance to fulfil its
potential to tackle the barriers which in turn block access to services and
public functions for disabled people.
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